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A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap willing but incom-
patible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically and empirically hard. Traditionally,
exchanges took place in cycles, with each participating patient-donor pair both giving and receiving a kidney.
The recent introduction of chains, where a donor without a paired patient triggers a sequence of donations
without requiring a kidney in return, increased the efficacy of fielded kidney exchanges—while also dramat-
ically raising the empirical computational hardness of clearing the market in practice. While chains can be
quite long, unbounded-length chains are not desirable: planned donations can fail before transplant for a
variety of reasons, and the failure of a single donation causes the rest of that chain to fail, so parallel shorter
chains are better in practice.
In this paper, we address the tractable clearing of kidney exchanges with short cycles and chains that are
long but bounded. This corresponds to the practice at most modern fielded kidney exchanges. We introduce
three new integer programming formulations, two of which are compact. Furthermore, one of these models
has a linear programming relaxation that is exactly as tight as the previous tightest formulation (which
was not compact) for instances in which each donor has a paired patient. On real data from the UNOS
nationwide exchange in the United States and the NLDKSS nationwide exchange in the United Kingdom,
as well as on generated realistic large-scale data, we show that our new models are competitive with all
existing solvers—in many cases outperforming all other solvers by orders of magnitude.
Finally, we note that our position-indexed chain-edge formulation can be modified in a straightforward
way to take post-match edge failure into account, under the restriction that edges have equal probabilities
of failure. Post-match edge failure is a primary source of inefficiency in presently-fielded kidney exchanges.
We show how to implement such failure-aware matching in our model, and also extend the state-of-the-art
general branch-and-price-based non-compact formulation for the failure-aware problem to run its pricing
problem in polynomial time.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Kidney exchange; matching markets; stochastic matching; integer pro-
gramming; branch and price
1. INTRODUCTION
Transplantation is the most effective treatment for kidney failure, yet transplant wait-
ing lists have grown rapidly in many countries. In the United States alone, the kidney
transplant waiting list grew from 58,000 people in 2004 to 99,000 people in 2014 [Hart
et al. 2016]. In order to increase the supply of kidneys for transplant, kidney exchange
schemes now operate in several countries, including the United States, United King-
dom, Netherlands, and South Korea.
A kidney exchange [Rapaport 1986; Roth et al. 2004] is a centrally-administered
barter exchange market for kidneys. If a patient with end-stage renal disease has a
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friend or family member who is willing to donate a kidney to him, but unable to do so
due to blood- or tissue-type incompatibility, the patient may enter the exchange in the
hope of exchanging his donor with the donor of another participating patient. Three-
way exchanges are also possible, but most schemes do not carry out four-way or longer
exchanges due to the requirement that transplants be carried out simultaneously, and
the risk that one of the participants may need to withdraw, in which case the cycle
does not go to execution and the pairs go back into the kidney exchange pool.
The scheme administrator carries out periodic “match runs” in which exchanges are
selected in order to maximize the number of planned transplants, or a similar goal—
perhaps prioritizing pediatric patients, or to those who have been waiting the longest.
A more recent development has been the introduction of non-directed donors (NDDs)
to kidney exchange schemes [Montgomery et al. 2006; Roth et al. 2006]. An NDD enters
the scheme with the intention of donating a kidney, but without a paired recipient.
Such a donor initiates a chain, in which the paired donor of each patient who receives
a kidney donates a kidney to the next patient. In contrast to cyclic exchanges, chains
can be carried out non-simultaneously, since patients later in the chain are not waiting
to be “repaid” for a donation that has already been made. In practice, it is desirable
to impose a cap on chain length, since there is an increasing chance that the final
exchanges planned for a chain will not proceed as the chain length is increased (due to
various reasons such as pre-transplant crossmatch incompatibility, death of a recipient
before transplant, the recipient receiving a deceased-donor kidney, and so on).
In many fielded kidney exchanges, an optimal solution is found by using an integer
programming (IP) solver to find a set of disjoint cyclic exchanges and chains that max-
imizes some scoring function. This approach has been tractable so far; Manlove and
O’Malley [2015] report that each instance up to October 2014 in the United Kingdom’s
National Living Donor Kidney Sharing Schemes (NLDKSS)—one of the largest kidney
exchange schemes—could be solved in under a second, with similar results using state-
of-the-art solvers at other large exchanges in the US [Anderson et al. 2015; Plaut et al.
2016a] and the Netherlands [Glorie et al. 2014]. However, there is an urgent need for
faster kidney exchange algorithms, for three reasons:
— Schemes have recently increased chain-length caps, and we expect further increases
as more schemes evolve towards using nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor
(NEAD) chains [Rees et al. 2009], which can extend across dozens of transplants.
— Opportunities exist for cross-border schemes, which will greatly increase the size of
the problem to be solved; indeed, collaborations have already occurred between, for
example, the USA and Greece, and between Portugal and Spain.
— The run time for kidney exchange algorithms depends on the problem instance, and
is difficult to predict. It is desirable to have improved algorithms to insure against
the possibility that future instances will be intractable for current solvers.
With that motivation, this paper presents new scalable integer-programming-based
approaches to optimally clearing large kidney exchange schemes, including two models
which can comfortably handle chain caps greater than 10.
1.1. Prior research
Substantial prior research helped grow kidney exchange from a thought experiment
to its present increasingly-ubiquitous state. We briefly overview the literature from
economics, computer science, and operations research.
Theoretical basis for kidney exchange. Roth et al. [2004; 2005; 2007] set the ground-
work for large-scale organized kidney exchange. These papers explored what efficient
matchings in a steady-state kidney exchange would look like; extensions by Ashlagi
et al. [2012], Ashlagi and Roth [2014], and Ding et al. [2015] address shortcomings
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in those theoretical models that appeared as kidney exchange became reality. Game-
theoretic models of kidney exchange, where transplant centers are viewed as agents
with a private type consisting of their internal pools, were presented and explored
by Ashlagi and Roth [2014], Toulis and Parkes [2015], and Ashlagi et al. [2015].
Various forms of dynamism, like uncertainty over the possible future vertices in the
pool [U¨nver 2010; Ashlagi et al. 2013; Akbarpour et al. 2014] or uncertainty over the
existence of particular edges [Blum et al. 2013; Dickerson et al. 2013; Blum et al. 2015]
have been explored from both an economic and algorithmic efficiency point of view.
Practical approaches to the kidney exchange clearing problem. The two fundamental
IP models for kidney exchange are the cycle formulation, which includes one binary
decision variable for each feasible cycle or chain, and the edge formulation, which in-
cludes one decision variable for each compatible pair of agents [Abraham et al. 2007;
Roth et al. 2007]. In the cycle formulation, the number of constraints is sublinear in
the input size, but the number of variables is exponential. In the edge formulation, the
number of variables is linear but the number of constraints is exponential. Optimally
solving these models has been an ongoing challenge for the past decade.
Constantino et al. [2013] introduced the first two compact IP formulations for kid-
ney exchange, where compact means that the counts of variables and constraints are
polynomial in the size of the input. Their extended edge formulation was shown em-
pirically to be effective in finding the optimal solution where the cycle-length cap is
greater than 3, particularly on dense graphs. However, each of the compact formula-
tions introduced by Constantino et al. has a weaker linear program (LP) relaxation
than the cycle formulation, even in the absence of NDDs.
The EE-MTZ model [Mak-Hau 2015], another compact formulation, uses the vari-
ables and constraints of the extended edge formulation to model cycles and a variant of
the Miller-Tucker-Zemlin model for the traveling salesman problem to model chains.
The same paper introduces the exponentially-sized SPLIT-MTZ model, which adds re-
dundant constraints to the edge formulation in order to tighten the LP relaxation.
A number of kidney exchange algorithms use the cycle formulation with branch and
price [Barnhart et al. 1998] to avoid the need to hold an exponential number of vari-
ables in memory [Abraham et al. 2007; Dickerson et al. 2013; Glorie et al. 2014; Kli-
mentova et al. 2014; Plaut et al. 2016a]. These have been the fastest algorithms to date
for the kidney exchange problem.
An alternative approach to avoiding the cost of keeping the entire model in mem-
ory has been constraint generation, using variants of the edge formulation [Abraham
et al. 2007]. Anderson et al. [2015] describe an approach based on an algorithm for
the prize-collecting traveling salesman problem. This algorithm is particularly effec-
tive for solving instances where the cycle-length cap is 3 and there is no cap on the
length of chains, but it is outperformed by branch-and-price-based approaches if a fi-
nite chain-length cap is used [Plaut et al. 2016a].
Alternative objectives for the kidney exchange problem include maximizing the ex-
pected number of transplants subject to post-match arc and vertex failures [Dicker-
son et al. 2013; Pedroso 2014; Alvelos et al. 2015]. Some fielded exchanges use lex-
icographic optimisation of a hierarchy of objectives [Glorie et al. 2014; Manlove and
O’Malley 2015]; we note that our models can be augmented to support this class of
objective function.
1.2. Our contribution
This paper introduces three integer program formulations for the kidney exchange
problem, two of which are compact. Model size (i.e., memory footprint) often constrains
today’s kidney exchange solvers; critically, our models are typically much smaller than
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the state of the art while managing to maintain tight linear program relaxations
(LPRs)—which in practice is quite important to proving optimality quickly.
In Section 3, we introduce the position-indexed edge formulation (PIEF), a model for
the kidney exchange problem with only cycles that is substantially smaller than, yet
has an LPR equivalent to, the model with the tightest LPR for the cycles-only version
of the problem [Abraham et al. 2007; Roth et al. 2007]. Section 3 presents the position-
indexed chain-edge formulation (PICEF) which compactly brings chains into the model
via a polynomial number of decision variables; the number of cycle decision variables is
exponential in just the maximum cycle length (which is typically only 3 or 4 in fielded
exchanges). To address that latter exponential reliance on the cycle length, we also
present a branch-and-price-based implementation of PICEF.1
Throughout, we prove new results regarding the tightness of the LPRs of our mod-
els relative to the current state of the art. The tightness of these relaxations hints
that our formulations will be competitive in practice; toward that end, we provide ex-
tensive experimental evidence that they are. In particular, we show that at least one
of PICEF and HPIEF is faster than the best solver from all those provably-optimal
solvers contributed in earlier papers that we evaluated in 96.41% of instances con-
sidered, with the speed-ups being most evident for larger instance sizes and larger
chain caps. In Section 6, we use real and generated data from two nationwide kidney
exchange programs—one in the UK, and one in the US—to compare our formulations
against other competitive solvers [Abraham et al. 2007; Klimentova et al. 2014; Ander-
son et al. 2015; Plaut et al. 2016a]. Our new formulations are on par or faster than all
other solvers, outperforming all other solvers by orders of magnitude on many problem
instances.
Finally, we demonstrate that our PICEF formulation can be adapted straightfor-
wardly to the so-called failure-aware model where arcs probabilistically fail after al-
gorithmic match but before transplantation, and we show how to adapt a recent (non-
compact) branch-and-price-based formulation due to Dickerson et al. [2013] to perform
pricing in polynomial time (Section 6).
2. PRELIMINARIES
Given a pool consisting of patient-donor pairs and non-directed donors (NDDs), we
model the kidney exchange problem using a directed graph D = (V,A). The set of
vertices V = {1, . . . , |V |} is partitioned into N = {1, . . . , |N |} representing the NDDs
and P = {|N |+ 1, . . . , |N |+ |P |} representing the patient-donor pairs.
For each i ∈ N and each j ∈ P , A contains the arc (i, j) if and only if NDD i is
compatible with patient j. For each i ∈ P and each j ∈ P \{i}, A contains the arc (i, j) if
and only if the paired donor2 of patient i is compatible with patient j. Each arc (i, j) ∈ A
has a weight wij ∈ R+ representing the priority that the scheme administrator gives
to that transplant. If the objective is to maximize the number of transplants, each arc
has unit weight; most fielded exchanges use weights to encode various prioritization
schemes and other value judgments about potential transplants.
Since NDDs do not have paired patients, each vertex representing an NDD has no
incoming arcs. Moreover, we assume that no patient is compatible with her own paired
donor, and therefore that the digraph has no loops. (The IP models introduced in this
1In Appendix C of the full version of the paper [Dickerson et al. 2016], we present the hybrid position-
indexed edge formulation (HPIEF), which combines PIEF and PICEF to yield a compact formulation, as
well as additional theoretical results and proofs.
2In this paper, we assume that each patient has a single paired donor. In practice, a patient may have
multiple donors; this can be modeled by regarding such a patient i’s vertex in D as representing i and all
of her paired donors; an arc (i, j) in D then represents compatibility between at least one of i’s donors and
patient j. Our model can also handle patients with no paired donor by drawing a vertex with no out edges.
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Fig. 1. The directed graph for a kidney-exchange instance with |N | = 2 and |P | = 5
paper can trivially be adapted to the case where loops exist by adding a binary variable
for each loop and modifying the objective and capacity constraints accordingly.)
We use the term chain to refer to a path in the digraph initiated by an NDD vertex,
and cycle to refer to a cycle in the directed graph (which must involve only vertices in
P , since vertices in N have no incoming arcs). The weight wc of each cycle or chain c is
defined as the sum of its arc weights.
Given a maximum cycle size K and a maximum chain length L, the kidney exchange
problem is an optimization problem where the objective is to select a vertex-disjoint
packing in D of cycles of size up to K and chains of length up to L that has maximum
weight. The problem is NP-hard for realistic parameterizations of K and L [Abraham
et al. 2007; Biro´ et al. 2009]. In practice, K is kept low due to the logistical constraint
of scheduling all transplants simultaneously. At both the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS) US-wide exchange and the UK’s NLDKSS, K = 3. The chain cap
L is typically longer due to chains being executed non-simultaneously; yet, typically
L 6= ∞ due to potential matches failing before transplantation. This paper addresses
the realistic setting of small cycle cap K and large—but finite—chain cap L.
Figure 1 shows a problem instance with |N | = 2 and |P | = 5. If each arc has
unit weight and K = L = 3, then the bold arcs show an optimal solution: cycle
((3, 4), (4, 5), (5, 3)) and chain ((1, 7), (7, 6)), with a total weight of 5.
3. PIEF: POSITION-INDEXED EDGE FORMULATION
3.1. Description of the model
In this section, we present our first of three new IP formulations, the position-indexed
edge formulation (PIEF). PIEF is a natural extension of the extended edge formulation
(EEF) of Constantino et al. [2013]. For this formulation, we assume that the problem
instance contains no NDDS.3
The PIEF, like the EEF, uses copies of the underlying compatibility digraph D. For
each vertex l ∈ V , let Dl = (V l, Al) be the subgraph of D induced by {i ∈ V : i ≥ l}. The
PIEF ensures that at most one cycle is selected in each copy, and that a cycle selected
in graph copy Dl must contain vertex l.
The first directed graph in Figure 2 is an instance with four patients which we will
use as an example in this section. The figure shows graph copies D1 (= D), D2, and
D3. The remaining graph copy, D4 = ({4}, {}), contains no arcs and is not shown.
The main innovation of the PIEF formulation is the use of arc positions to index
variables; the position of an arc in a cycle is defined as follows. Let c = (a1, . . . , a|c|)
be a cycle represented as a list of arcs in A. Further, assume that we use the unique
representation of c such that a1 leaves the lowest-numbered vertex involved in the
cycle. For 1 ≤ i ≤ |c|, we say that ai has position i.
We define K(i, j, l), the set of positions at which arc (i, j) is permitted to be selected
in a cycle in graph copy Dl. For i, j, l ∈ V such that (i, j) ∈ Al, let
3In Appendix C of the full version of this paper, we present the hybrid PIEF (HPIEF), a compact generali-
sation of PIEF which can be used for instances with NDDs.
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Fig. 2. A kidney exchange instance D with |N | = 0 and |P | = 4, along with graph copies D1 (= D), D2,
and D3. D4 = ({4}, {}) is not shown.
K(i, j, l) =

{1} i = l
{2, . . . ,K − 1} i, j > l
{2, . . . ,K} j = l.
Thus, an arc may be selected at position 1 in graph copy l if and only if it leaves
vertex l, and any arc selected at position K in graph copy l must enter l.
Now, create a set of binary decision variables as follows. For i, j, l ∈ P such that
(i, j) ∈ Al, create variable xlijk for each k ∈ K(i, j, l). Variable xlijk takes the value 1 if
and only if arc (i, j) is selected at position k of a cycle in graph copy Dl. Returning to
our example instance and letting K = 3, we give x1342 as an example of a variable in the
model; this represents the arc (3, 4) being used in position 2 of a cycle in graph copy 1.
In full, the set of variables created for this instance is x1121, x1212, x1213, x1232, x1342, x1412,
x1413, x1422, x1432 (in graph copy D1), x2231, x2342, x2422, x2423, x2432 (in graph copy D2), x3341,
x3432, and x3433 (in graph copy D3).
The following integer program finds the optimal cycle packing.
max
∑
l∈V
∑
(i,j)∈Al
∑
k∈K(i,j,l)
wijx
l
ijk (1a)
s.t.
∑
l∈V
∑
j:(j,i)∈Al
∑
k∈K(j,i,l)
xljik ≤ 1 i ∈ V (1b)
∑
j:(j,i)∈Al∧
k∈K(j,i,l)
xljik =
∑
j:(i,j)∈Al∧
k+1∈K(i,j,l)
xli,j,k+1
l ∈ V,
i ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}
(1c)
xlijk ∈ {0, 1} l ∈ V, (i, j) ∈ Al, k ∈ K(i, j, l) (1d)
The objective (1a) is to maximize the weighted sum of selected arcs. Constraint (1b)
is the capacity constraint for vertices: for each vertex i ∈ V , there must be at most one
selected arc whose target is i. Constraint (1c) is the flow conservation constraint. For
each graph copy Dl, each vertex i in Dl except the lowest-numbered vertex, and each
arc position k < K, the number of selected arcs at position k with target i is equal to
the number of selected arcs at position k+1 with source i. Constraint (1d) ensures that
no fractional solutions are selected.4
We note that PIEF is not the first IP model for a directed-graph program to use
position-indexed variables; Vajda [1961] uses position-indexed variables for subtour
elimination in a model for the travelling salesman problem (TSP). Vajda’s model is
substantially different from the PIEF; most notably, graph copies are not required for
Vajda’s model because any TSP solution contains exactly one cycle.
4Theorem A.3 in Appendix A.1 of the full paper establishes the correctness of the PIEF model.
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Fig. 3. A graph copy where the reduced PIEF decreases the number of variables in the integer program
3.2. Further reducing the size of the basic PIEF model
We now present methods for reducing the size of the PIEF model while maintaining
provable optimality. These reductions are performed as a polynomial-time preprocess
(prior to solving the NP-hard kidney exchange clearing problem), and thus may result
in practical run time improvements.
3.2.1. Basic reduced PIEF. In typical problem instances, there are many (i, j, k, l) tuples
such that xlijk takes the value zero in any assignment that satisfies constraints (1b)-
(1d). For example, suppose that K = 4 and that Figure 3 is graph copy D1. Arc (6, 7)
cannot be chosen at position 3 of a cycle, since the arc only appears in one cycle and it
is at position 2 of that cycle. Hence, if we could eliminate variable x1673 from the integer
program it would not change the optimal solution. Similarly, all variables for the arc
(3, 4) within this graph copy could be eliminated, since this arc does not appear in any
cycle of length less than 5.
Following the approach used by Constantino et al. [2013] for the extended edge for-
mulation, we eliminate variables as follows. For i, j ∈ V l, let dlij be the length of the
shortest path in terms of arcs from i to j in Dl. For (i, j) ∈ Al, let
Kred(i, j, l) = {k : 1 ≤ k ≤ K ∧ dlli < k ∧ dljl ≤ (K − k)}.
For any k /∈ Kred(i, j, l), no cycle in graph copy Dl of length less than or equal to K
contains (i, j) at position k, since either there is no sufficiently short path from l to i
or there is no sufficiently short path from j to l. Note that Kred(i, j, l) ⊆ K(i, j, l). We
can substitute Kred(i, j, l) for K(i, j, l) in (1a)-(1d), yielding a smaller integer program—
PIEF-reduced (PIEFR)—with the same optimal solution.
3.2.2. Elimination of variables at position 1 andK: the PIEFR2 formulation. In the PIEFR model
with K ≥ 3, variables at position 1 are redundant, since xllj1 = 1 if and only if xlji2 = 1
for some i. Similarly, variables at position K are redundant; xljlK = 1 if and only if
xlij(K−1) = 1 for some i. We can eliminate variables at positions 1 and K from PIEFR
as follows. Define a modified weight function w′: for all i, j, l ∈ P such that (i, j) ∈ Al
and all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}, let
w′(i, j, k, l) =

wij + wli k = 2
wij + wjl k = K − 1
wij otherwise.
With this weight function, a selected arc (i, j) at position 2 of a cycle inDl contributes
to the objective value its own weight plus the weight of the implicitly selected arc (l, i).
An arc (i, j) at position K−1 of a cycle in Dl contributes its own weight plus the weight
of of the implicitly selected arc (j, l).
For i, j, l ∈ P such that (i, j) ∈ Al, define the restricted set of permitted arc positions:
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Kred2(i, j, l) = Kred(i, j, l) \ {1,K}.
For i, j, l ∈ P such that (i, j) ∈ Al, and for each k ∈ Kred2(i, j, l), create a binary
variable xlijk . The following IP, denoted PIEFR
2 (PIEF reduced twice), is solved.
max
∑
l∈V
∑
(i,j)∈Al
∑
k∈Kred2 (i,j,l)
w′(i, j, k, l)xlijk subject to (2a)
∑
l∈V

∑
j:(j,i)∈Al
∑
k∈Kred2 (j,i,l)
xljik +
∑
j:(i,j)∈Al∧
2∈Kred2 (i,j,l)
xlij2
+
∑
h,j:j 6=i∧
(h,j)∈Ai∧
K−1∈Kred2 (h,j,i)
xihj(K−1) ≤ 1 i ∈ V (2b)
∑
j:(j,i)∈Al∧
k∈Kred2 (j,i,l)
xljik =
∑
j:(i,j)∈Al∧
k+1∈Kred2 (i,j,l)
xli,j,k+1
l ∈ V,
i ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},
k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 2}
(2c)
xlijk ∈ {0, 1}
l ∈ V, (i, j) ∈ Al,
k ∈ Kred2(i, j, l)
(2d)
The constraints of PIEFR2 differ from those of PIEFR (1b-1d) in the following two
respects. First, the second term in parentheses in the PIEFR2 capacity constraint for
vertex i (2b) ensures that any selected arc (i, j) at position 2 of a cycle in Dl counts
towards the capacity for i, since it is implicit that the arc (l, i) is also chosen. The final
term on the left-hand side of constraint (2b) serves the same function for selected arcs
at position K − 1, since an arc at position K is implicitly chosen. Second, the flow
conservation constraint (2c) is not required for k ∈ {1,K − 1}, since arcs at positions 1
and K are not modelled explicitly in PIEFR2.
3.2.3. Vertex-ordering heuristic. We can reduce the number of variables in the reduced
PIEF model by carefully choosing the order of vertex labels in the digraph D. We have
found that relabelling the vertices in descending order of total degree is an effective
heuristic to this end. To estimate the effect of this ordering heuristic on model size, we
generated the PIEFR2 model for each of the ten PrefLib instances [Mattei and Walsh
2013] with 256 vertices and no NDDs. The heuristic reduced the variable count by a
mean of 38 percent, and reduced the constraint count by a mean of 60 percent.
3.3. PIEF has a tight LPR
We now compare the LPR bound of PIEF to those of other popular IP models. The
tightness of an LPR is typically viewed as a proxy for how well an IP model will per-
form in practice, due to the important role the relaxation plays in modern branch-and-
bound-based tree search. In this section, we compare the LPR of PIEF against the IP
formulation with the tightest LPR, the cycle formulation. While the number of deci-
sion variables in the cycle formulation model is exponential in the cycle cap K, PIEF
maintains an LPR that is just as tight, but has far fewer variables if K > 3.
3.3.1. Cycle formulation. We begin by reviewing the cycle formulation due to Abraham
et al. [2007] and Roth et al. [2007], and note that the formulation is equivalent to
that due to Anderson et al. [2015] if chains are disallowed. In the cycle formulation, a
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binary variable zc is used for each feasible cycle or chain c to represent whether it is
selected in the solution. For each vertex v, there is a constraint to ensure that v is in at
most selected cycle or chain. Let C be the set of cycles in D of length at most K and let
C′ be the set of NDD-initiated chains in D of length at most L. The model to be solved
is as follows.
max
∑
c∈C∪C′
wczc (3a)
s.t.
∑
c∈C∪C′:i appears in c
zc ≤ 1 i : 1 ≤ i ≤ |V | (3b)
zc ∈ {0, 1} c ∈ C ∪ C′ (3c)
Constraints (3b) ensure that the selected cycles and chains are vertex disjoint.
3.3.2. LPR of PIEF. We now show that the LPR of PIEF is exactly as tight as that of the
cycle formulation. Formally, ifA andB are two IP formulations for the kidney exchange
problem, we write that A weakly dominates B, denoted ZA  ZB , if for every problem
instance, the LPR objective value under A is no greater than the LPR objective value
under B. Further, we say that A strictly dominates B, denoted ZA ≺ ZB , if ZA  ZB
and for some problem instance, the LPR objective value under A is strictly smaller
than the LPR objective value under B. Finally, we write ZA = ZB if ZA  ZB and
ZB  ZA.
THEOREM 3.1. ZCF = ZPIEF (without chains).
4. PICEF: POSITION-INDEXED CHAIN-EDGE FORMULATION
4.1. Description of the model
Our second new IP formulation, PICEF, uses a variant of PIEF for chains, and—like
the cycle formulation—uses one binary variable for each cycle. The idea of using vari-
ables for arcs in chains and a variable for each cycle was introduced in the PC-TSP-
based algorithm of Anderson et al. [2015]. The innovation in our IP model is the use
of position indices on arc variables, which results in polynomial counts of constraints
and arc-variables; this is in contrast to the exponential number of constraints in the
PC-TSP-based model.
Unlike PIEF, PICEF does not require copies of D. Intuitively, this is because a chain
is a simpler structure than a cycle, with no requirement for a final arc back to the
initial vertex.
We define K′(i, j), the set of possible positions at which arc (i, j) may occur in a chain
in the digraph D. For i, j ∈ V such that (i, j) ∈ A,
K′(i, j) =
{{1} i ∈ N
{2, . . . , L} i ∈ P .
Thus, any arc leaving an NDD can only be in position 1 of a chain, and any arc
leaving a patient vertex may be in any position up to the cycle-length cap L, except 1.
For each (i, j) ∈ A and each k ∈ K′(i, j), create variable yijk, which takes value 1
if and only if arc (i, j) is selected at position k of some chain. For each cycle c in D of
length up to K, define a binary variable zc to indicate whether c is used in a packing.
For example, consider the instance in Figure 4, in which |N | = 2 and |P | = 4. Suppose
that K = 3 and L = 4, and suppose further that each arc has unit weight. The IP model
includes variables y131, y141, and y241, corresponding to arcs leaving NDDs. For each
k ∈ 2, 3, 4, the model includes variables y34k, y45k, y56k, y64k, and y65k, corresponding to
arcs between donor-patient pairs at position k of a chain. Finally, the model includes
zc variables for the cycles ((4, 5), (5, 6), (6, 4)) and ((5, 6), (6, 5)).
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Fig. 4. An instance with |N | = 2 and |P | = 4
The following IP is solved to find a maximum-weight packing of cycles and chains.
max
∑
(i,j)∈A
∑
k∈K′(i,j)
wijyijk +
∑
c∈C
wczc (4a)
s.t.
∑
j:(j,i)∈A
∑
k∈K′(j,i)
yjik +
∑
c∈C:i appears in c
zc ≤ 1 i ∈ P (4b)
∑
j:(i,j)∈A
yij1 ≤ 1 i ∈ N (4c)
∑
j:(j,i)∈A∧
k∈K′(j,i)
yjik ≥
∑
j:(i,j)∈A
yi,j,k+1
i ∈ P,
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} (4d)
yijk ∈ {0, 1} (i, j) ∈ A, k ∈ K′(i, j) (4e)
zc ∈ {0, 1} c ∈ C (4f)
Inequality (4b) is the capacity constraint for patients: each patient vertex is involved
in at most one chosen cycle or incoming arc of a chain. Inequality (4c) is the capacity
constraint for NDDs: each NDD vertex is involved in at most one chosen outgoing arc.
The flow inequality (4d) ensures that patient-donor pair vertex i has an outgoing arc
at position k + 1 of a selected chain only if i has an incoming arc at position k; we use
an inequality rather than an equality since the final vertex of a chain will have an
incoming arc but no outgoing arc.5
We now give an example of each of the inequalities (4b–4d) for the instance in Fig-
ure 4. For i = 4, the capacity constraint (4b) ensures that y141 + y241 + y342 + y343 +
y344 + z((4,5),(5,6),(6,4)) ≤ 1. For i = 1, the NDD capacity constraint (4c) ensures that
y131 + y141 ≤ 1. For i = 5 and k = 2, the chain flow constraint (4d) ensures that
z452 + z652 ≥ z563; that is, the outgoing arc (5, 6) can only be selected at position 3 of a
chain if an incoming arc to vertex 5 is selected at position 2 of a chain.
In our example in Figure 4, the optimal objective value is 4. One satisfying assign-
ment that gives this objective value is y131 = y342 = z((5,6),(6,5)) = 1, with all other
variables equal to zero.
4.2. Practical implementation of the PICEF model
We now discuss methods for the practical implementation of PICEF, first by reduc-
ing the number of decision variables via a polynomial-time preprocess, and second by
tackling the large number of decision variables for cyclic exchanges via a branch-and-
price-based transformation of the model.
4.2.1. Reduced PICEF. We can reduce the PICEF model using a similar approach to
the PIEF reduction in Subsection 3.2.1. For i ∈ P , let d(i) be length of the shortest
path in terms of arcs from some j ∈ N to i. Since any outgoing arc from i cannot
5Theorem B.4 in Appendix B.1 of the full paper establishes the correctness of the PICEF model.
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appear at position less than d(i) + 1 in a chain, we can replace K′ in PICEF with Kred,
defined as follows:
Kred(i, j) =
{{1} i ∈ N
{d(i) + 1, . . . , L} i ∈ P.
4.2.2. A branch and price implementation of PICEF. We now discuss a method for scaling
PICEF to graphs with high cycle caps, or large graphs with many cycles; this method
maintains the full set of arc decision variables, but only incrementally considers those
corresponding to cycles.
Formally, for V = P ∪N , the number of cycles of length at most K is O(|P |K), mak-
ing explicit representation and enumeration of all cycles infeasible for large enough
instances. With one decision variable per cycle, Abraham et al. [2007] could not even
write the full integer program in memory for instances as small as 1000 pairs.
Branch and price is a method where only a subset of the decision variables are kept
in memory, and columns (in the case of PICEF, only those corresponding to cycle vari-
ables) are slowly added until correctness is proven at each node in a branch-and-bound
search tree. If necessary, superfluous columns can also be removed from the model, in
order to prevent its size from exceeding memory.
The following process occurs at each node in the search tree: first, the LP relaxation
of the current model (which may contain only a small number of cycles) is solved. The
next step is to generate positive price cycles: cycles that have the potential to improve
the objective value if included in the model.
The price of a cycle c is given by
∑
(i,j)∈c(wij−δi), where δi is the dual value of vertex
i. While there exist any positive price cycles at a node in the search tree, optimality of
the reduced LP has not yet been proved at that node. The pricing problem is to bring
at least one new positive price cycle into the model, or prove that none exist. Multiple
methods exist for solving the pricing problem in kidney exchange [Abraham et al. 2007;
Glorie et al. 2014; Mak-Hau 2015; Plaut et al. 2016a]; in our experimental section, we
use the cycle pricer of Glorie et al. [2014] with the bugfix of Plaut et al. [2016a].
Once no more positive price cycles exist, the reduced LP at a specific node is guaran-
teed to be optimal. However, it may not be integral: in this case, branching occurs, as
in standard brand-and-bound tree search. In our experiments, we explore branches in
depth-first-order unless optimality is proven at all nodes in the search tree.
4.3. The LPR of PICEF is not as tight
As an analogue to Section 3, we now compare the LPR of PICEF against the cycle for-
mulation LPR. Unlike in the PIEF case, where Theorem 3.1 showed an equivalence
between the two models’ relaxations, we show that PICEF’s relaxation can be looser
than that of the cycle formulation. Theorem 4.1 gives a simple construction showing
this, while Theorem 4.2 presents a family of graphs on which PICEF’s LPR is arbitrar-
ily worse than that of the cycle formulation.
THEOREM 4.1. ZCF ≺ ZPICEF (with chains).
Indeed, Theorem 4.2 shows that the ratio between the optimum objective value for
the relaxations of PICEF and the cycle formulation can be made arbitrarily large.
THEOREM 4.2. Let z ∈ R+ be given. There exists a problem instance for which
ZPICEF/ZCF > z, where ZPICEF is the objective value of the LPR of PICEF and ZCF is the
objective value of the LPR of the cycle formulation.
While the results of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 may be disheartening, in the following
section, we give experimental evidence that PICEF (as well as its branch-and-price-
based interpretation) perform extremely competitively on real and generated data.
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5. EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF STATE-OF-THE-ART KIDNEY EXCHANGE SOLVERS
In this section, we compare implementations of our new models against existing state
of the art kidney exchange solvers. To ensure a fair comparison, we received code from
the author of each solver that is not introduced in this paper. We compare run times of
the following state-of-the-art solvers:
— BNP-DFS, the original branch-and-price-based cycle formulation solver due
to Abraham et al. [2007];
— BNP-POLY, a branch-and-price-based cycle formulation solver with pricing due
to Glorie et al. [2014] and Plaut et al. [2016a];6
— CG-TSP, a recent IP formulation based on a model for the prize-collecting traveling
salesman problem, with constraint generation [Anderson et al. 2015];
— PICEF, the model from Section 4 of this paper;
— BNP-PICEF, a branch and price version of the PICEF model, as presented in Sec-
tion 4.2.2 of this paper;
— HPIEF, the Hybrid PIEF model from Appendix C of the full version of this paper
(which reduces to PIEF for L = 0); and
— BNP-DCD, a branch-and-price algorithm using the Disaggregated Cycle Decompo-
sition model, which is related to both the cycle formulation and the extended edge
formulation [Klimentova et al. 2014].
A cycle-length cap of 3 and a time limit of 3600 seconds was imposed on each run.
When a timeout occurred, we counted the run-time as 3600 seconds.
We test on two types of data: real and generated. Section 5.1 shows run time results
on real match runs, including 286 runs from the UNOS US-wide exchange, which now
contains 143 transplant centers, and 17 runs from the NLDKSS UK-wide exchange,
which uses 24 transplant centers. Section 5.2 increases the size and varies other traits
of the compatibility graphs via a realistic generator seeded by the real UNOS data. We
find that PICEF and HPIEF substantially outperform all other models.
5.1. Real match runs from the UK- and US-wide exchanges
We now present results on real match run data from two fielded nationwide kidney
exchanges: The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) US-wide kidney exchange
where the decisions are made by algorithms and software from Prof. Sandholm’s group,
and the UK kidney exchange (NLDKSS) where the decisions are made by algorithms
and software from Dr. Manlove’s group.7 The UNOS instances used include all the
match runs starting from the beginning of the exchange in October 2010 to January
2016. The exchange has grown significantly during that time and chains have been
incorporated. The match cadence has increased from once a month to twice a week;
that keeps the number of altruists relatively small. On average, these instances have
|N | = 2, |P | = 231, and |A| = 5021. The NLDKSS instances cover the 17 quarterly
match runs during the period January 2012–January 2016. On average, these instances
have |N | = 7, |P | = 201, and |A| = 3272.
Figure 5 shows mean run times across all match runs for both exchanges; Ap-
pendix E in the full version of the paper gives additional statistics like minimum and
maximum run times, as well as their standard deviations. Immediately obvious is that
6Recently, Plaut et al. [2016b] showed a correctness bug in both implementations of the BNP-POLY-style
solvers due to Glorie et al. [2014] and Plaut et al. [2016a]; for posterity, we still include these run times.
Furthermore, we note that the objective values returned by BNP-POLY always equaled that of the other
provably-correct solvers on all of our test instances.
7Due to privacy constraints on sharing real healthcare data, the UNOS and NLDKSS experimental runs
were necessarily performed on different computers—one in the US and one in the UK. All runs within a
figure were performed on the same machine, so relative comparisons of solvers within a figure are accurate.
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the non-compact formulations—BNP-DFS and CG-TSP—tend to scale poorly com-
pared to our newer formulations. Interestingly, BNP-PICEF tends to perform worse
than the base PICEF and HPIEF; we hypothesize that this is because branch-and-
price-based methods are necessarily more “heavyweight” than standard IP techniques,
and the small size of presently-fielded kidney exchange pools may not yet warrant this
more advanced technique. Perhaps most critically, both PICEF and HPIEF clear real
match runs in both exchanges within seconds.
In the NLDKSS results, the wide fluctuation in mean run time as the chain cap is
varied can be explained by the small sample size of available NLDKSS instances, and
the fact that the algorithms other than HPIEF and PICEF occasionally timed out at
one hour. By contrast, each of the HPIEF and PICEF runs on NLDKSS instances took
less than five seconds to complete. We also note that the LP relaxation of PICEF and
HPIEF are very tight in practice; the LPR bound equaled the IP optimum for 614 of
the 663 runs carried out on NLDKSS data.
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Fig. 5. Mean run times for various solvers on 286 real match runs from the UNOS exchange (left), and 17
real match runs from the UK NLDKSS exchange (right).
We remark that the BNP-DCD model due to Klimentova et al. [2014] was run on
all NLDKSS instances where the chain cap L was equal to 0. Larger values of L could
not be tested since the current implementation of the model in our possession does not
accept NDDs in the input. However for the case that L = 0 the BNP-DCD model was
the fastest for all NLDKSS instances.
Finally we note that the solver of Glorie et al. [2014] was executed on the NLDKSS
instances with a chain cap of L, for 0 ≤ L ≤ 4. It was found that on average the
execution time was 8.9 times slower than the fastest solver from among all the others
executed on these instances as detailed at the beginning of Section 5. PICEF was the
fastest solver on 40% of occasions.
5.2. Scaling experiments on realistic generated UNOS kidney exchange graphs
As motivated earlier in the paper, it is expected that kidney exchange pools will grow
in size as (a) the idea of kidney exchange becomes more commonplace, and barriers
to entry continue to drop, as well as (b) organized large-scale international exchanges
manifest. Toward that end, in this section, we test solvers on generated compatibility
graphs from a realistic simulator seeded by all historical UNOS data; the generator
samples patient-donor pairs and NDDs with replacement, and draws arcs in the com-
patibility graph in accordance with UNOS’ internal arc creation rules.
Figure 6 gives results for increasing numbers of patient-donor pairs (each column),
as well as increasing numbers of non-directed donors as a percentage of the number
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of patient-donor pairs (each row). As expected, as the number of patient-donor pairs
increases, so too do run times for all solvers. Still, in each of the experiments, for each
chain cap, both PICEF and HPIEF are on par or (typically) much faster—sometimes
by orders of magnitude compared to other solvers. Appendix E in the full version of
the paper gives these results in tabular form, including other statistics—minimum
and maximum run times, as well as their standard deviations—that were not possible
to show in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6. Mean run time as the number of patient-donor pairs |P | ∈ {300, 500, 700} increases (left to right),
as the percentage of NDDs in the pool increases |N | = {1%, 2%, 5%, 25%} of |P | (top to bottom), for varying
finite chain caps.
In addition to their increased scalability, we note two additional benefits of the
PICEF and HPIEF models proposed in this paper: reduced variance in run time, and
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relative ease of implementation when compared to other state-of-the-art solution tech-
niques. In both the real and simulated experimental results, we find that the run
time of both the PICEF and HPIEF formulations is substantially less variable than
the branch-and-price-based and constraint-generation-based IP solvers. While the un-
derlying problem being solved is NP-hard, and thus will always present worst-case
instances that take substantially longer than is typical to solve, the increased pre-
dictability of the run time of these models relative to other state-of-the-art solutions—
including those that are presently fielded—is attractive. Second, we note that signif-
icant engineering effort is involved in the creation of custom branch-and-price and
constraint-generation-based codes, while both PICEF and HPIEF are implemented
with relative ease, relying on only a single call to a black box IP solver.
6. FAILURE-AWARE KIDNEY EXCHANGE
Real-world exchanges all suffer to varying degrees from “last-minute” failures, where
an algorithmic match or set of matches fails to move to transplantation. This can occur
for a variety of reasons, including more extensive medical testing performed before a
surgery, a patient or donor becoming too sick to participate, or a patient receiving an
organ from another exchange or from the deceased donor waiting list.
To address these post-match arc failures, Dickerson et al. [2013] augments the
standard model of kidney exchange to include a success probability p for each arc
in the graph. They show how to solve this model using branch and price, where the
pricing problem is solved in time exponential in the chain and cycle cap. Prior com-
pact formulations—and, indeed, prior “edge formulations” like those due to Abraham
et al. [2007], Constantino et al. [2013], and Anderson et al. [2015]—are not expressive
enough to allow for generalization to this model. Intuitively, while a single arc failure
prevents an entire cycle from executing, chains are capable of incremental execution,
yielding utility from the NDD to the first arc failure. Thus, the expected utility gained
from an arc in a chain is dependent on where in the chain that arc is located, which is
not expressed in those models.
6.1. PICEF for failure-aware matching
With only minor modification, PICEF allows for implementation of failure-aware kid-
ney exchange, under the restriction that each arc is assumed to succeed with equal
probability p. While this assumption of equal probabilities is likely not true in prac-
tice, Dickerson et al. [2013] motivate why a fielded implementation of this model would
potentially choose to equalize all failure probabilities: namely, so that already-sick
patients—who will likely have higher failure rates—are not further marginalized by
this model. Thus, given a single success probability p, we can simply rewrite the PICEF
objective function as
∑
(i,j)∈A
∑
k∈K′(i,j) p
kwijyijk +
∑
c∈C p
|c|wczc, which returns the
maximum expected weight matching.
This objective is split into two parts: the utility received from arcs in chains, and
the utility received from cycles. For the latter, a cycle c of size |c| has probability p|c| of
executing; otherwise, it yields zero utility. For the former, if an arc is used at position
k in a chain, then it yields a pk fraction of its original weight—that is, the probability
that the underlying chain will execute at least through its first k arcs.
6.2. Failure-aware polynomial pricing for cycles
The initial failure-aware branch-and-price work by Dickerson et al. [2013] generalized
the pricing strategy of Abraham et al. [2007], and thus suffered from a pricing problem
that ran in time exponential in cycle and chain cap. Glorie et al. [2014] and Plaut et al.
[2016a] discussed polynomial pricing algorithms for cycles—but not chains [Plaut et al.
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Algorithm 1 Polynomial-time failure-aware pricing for cycles.
1: function GETDISCOUNTEDPOSITIVEPRICECYCLES(D = (V,A),K, p, w, δ)
2: C ← ∅
3: for each k = 2...K do . Consider all possible cycle lengths
4: wk(i, j)← δj − pkwij ∀(i, j) ∈ A . Reduction of Glorie et al. [2014]
5: C ← C ∪ GETNEGATIVECYCLES(D, k,wk)
6: return C
2016b]—in the deterministic case. Using the algorithm of Plaut et al. [2016a] as a
subroutine, we present an algorithm which solves the failure-aware, or discounted,
pricing problem for cycles in polynomial time, under the restriction that all arcs have
equal success probability p.
In the deterministic setting, the price of a cycle c is
∑
(i,j)∈c wij−
∑
j∈c δj , where wij is
the weight of arc (i, j), and δj is the dual value of vertex j in the LP. Glorie et al. [2014]
show how the arc weights and dual values can be collapsed into just arc weights, and
reduce the deterministic pricing problem to finding negative-weight cycles of length at
most K in a directed graph. In this section, we use “length” to denote the number of
vertices in a cycle, not its weight.
The discounted price of a cycle is p|c|
∑
(i,j)∈c wij −
∑
j∈c δj . Since the utility of an
arc now depends on what cycle it ends up in, we cannot collapse arc weights and dual
values without knowing the length of the cycle containing it.
With this motivation, we augment the algorithm to run O(K) iterations for each
source vertex: one for each possible final cycle length. On each iteration, we know
exactly how much arc weights will be worth in the final cycle, so we can reduce the
discounted pricing problem to the deterministic pricing problem.
Pseudocode for the failure-aware cycle pricing algorithm is given by GETDISCOUNT-
EDPOSITIVEPRICECYCLES. Let w and δ be the arc weights and dual values respec-
tively in the original graph. The function GETNEGATIVECYCLES is the deterministic
pricing algorithm due to Plaut et al. [2016a] which returns at least one negative cycle
of length at most K, or shows that none exist.
The algorithm of Plaut et al. [2016a] has complexity O(|V ||A|K2). Considering all
K − 1 possible cycle lengths brings the complexity of our algorithm to O(|V ||A|K3).
THEOREM 6.1. If there is a discounted positive price cycle in the graph, Algorithm 1
will return at least one discounted positive price cycle.
7. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we addressed the tractable clearing of kidney exchanges with short cycles
and long, but bounded, chains. This is motivated by kidney exchange practice, where
chains are often long but bounded in length due to post-match arc failure. We intro-
duced three IP formulations, two of which are compact, and favorably compared their
LPRs to a state-of-the-art formulation with a tight relaxation. Then, on real data from
the UNOS US nationwide exchange and the NLDKSS United Kingdom nationwide ex-
change, as well as on generated data, we showed that our new models outperform all
other solvers on realistically-parameterized kidney exchange problems–often dramati-
cally. We also explored practical extensions of our models, such as the use of branch and
price for additional scalability, and an extension to the failure-aware kidney exchange
case that more accurately mimics reality.
Beyond the immediate importance of more scalable static kidney exchange solvers
for use in fielded exchanges, solvers like the ones presented in this paper are of prac-
tical importance in more advanced—and as yet unfielded—approaches to clearing kid-
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ney exchange. In reality, patients and donors arrive to and depart from the exchange
dynamically over time [U¨nver 2010]. Approaches to clearing dynamic kidney exchange
often rely on solving the static problem many times [Awasthi and Sandholm 2009;
Dickerson et al. 2012; Anderson 2014; Dickerson and Sandholm 2015; Glorie et al.
2015]; thus, faster static solvers result in better dynamic exchange solutions. Use of
the techniques in this paper—or adaptations thereof—as subsolvers is of interest.
From a theoretical point of view, extending the comparison of LPRs to a complete
ordering of all LPRs amongst models of kidney exchange—especially for different pa-
rameterizations of the underlying model, like the inclusion of chains or arc failures—
would give insight as to which solver is best suited for an exchange running under a
specific set of business constraints.
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